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Abstract

Interveners make submissions in about half of the cases heard by the Supreme Court of Canada, but the
motivations for and consequences of the practice are not clearly understood. Considered broadly, there are at
least three functions that the practice of intervention might perform. The first possibility is that hearing from
interveners might provide objectively useful information to the Court (i.e., interveners might promote the
"accuracy" of the Court's decision making). A second possibility is that the practice of intervention allows
interveners to provide the "best argument" for certain partisan interests that judges might want to "affiliate"
with. A third possibility is that interventions are allowed mainly (if not only) so that intervening parties feel
they have had their voices heard by the Court and the greater public, including Parliament, regardless of the
effect on the outcome of the appeal (i.e., the Court might be promoting the "acceptability" of its decisions by
allowing for an outlet for expression). We examine empirically the role of interveners in all the cases decided
by the Supreme Court of Canada from January 2000 to July 2009 and find statistical evidence that interveners
matter.
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Interventions at the Supreme Court of
Canada: Accuracy, Affiliation, and
Acceptance
BENJAMIN R.D. ALARIE* & ANDREW J. GREEN**
Interveners make submissions in about half of the cases heard by the Supreme Court of
Canada, but the motivations for and consequences of the practice are not clearly understood.
Considered broadly, there are at Least three functions that the practice of intervention
might perform. The first possibility is that hearing from interveners might provide objectively
useful information to the Court (i.e., interveners might promote the "accuracy" of the
Court's decision making). A second possibility is that the practice of intervention allows
interveners to provide the "best argument" for certain partisan interests that judges might
want to "affiliate" with. A third possibility is that interventions are allowed mainly [if not
only) so that intervening parties feel they have had their voices heard by the Court and the
greater public, including Parliament, regardless of the effect on the outcome of the appeal
(Le., the Court might be promoting the "acceptability" of its decisions by allowing for an
outlet for expression). We examine empirically the role of interveners in all the cases
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada from January 2000 to July 2009 and find statistical
evidence that interveners matter.
Les intervenants font des soumissions dans environ Ia moitie des causes entendues par Ia
Cour supreme du Canada, mais les motivations et les consequences de [a pratique ne
sont pas comprises clairement. Dans l'ensemble, it y a au moins trois fonctions que [a
pratique de ['intervention pourrait accomplir. Premierement, ['audition des intervenants peut
procurer objectivement des renseignements utiles au tribunal (c.-a-d.que les intervenants
peuvent promouvoir I'< exactitude >>de [a prise de d6cision du tribunal). Une deuxieme possibilit6 est que [a pratique de l'intervention permet aux intervenants de fournir le <<meiLteur
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argument >>a t'6gard de certains intarats partisans auxquels Les juges pourraient souhaiter
s'<< affitier >. Une troisiame possibilit6 est que Les interventions sont essentiettement
autorisaes Isinon uniquement), de sorte que Les intervenants sentent qu'its ont pu faire
entendre leur voix aupres de LaCour et du grand public, y compris le ParLement, sans
6gard a Leffet du r6sultat de t appet (c.-h-d que Letribunal pourrait faire Lapromotion de
L1<
acceptabilite >>de ses decisions en autorisant une avenue pour ('expression). Nous
examinons de facon empirique te rate des intervenants dans tous tes cas pour lesquels La
Cour suprame du Canada a rendu une d6cision de janvier 2000 a juillet 2009, et nous avons
constat6 une 6vidence statistique de timportance des intervenants.
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OVER THE PAST DECADE, interveners have been active at an unprecedented level
at the Supreme Court of Canada. Under Chief Justice McLachlin, the Court has
allowed an average of 176 interventions per calendar year,' and interveners have
made submissions in almost half of the cases heard by the Court.' Despite the
frequency of activity and the resources contributed to the collective intervention
effort, the effects on the Court's decision making are poorly understood. A growing body of empirical literature examines the effects of amicus curiae at the US
Supreme Court.' The empirical literature is not as developed regarding the
effects of intervention on the decision making of the Supreme Court of Canada,
although interventions at the Court have been repeatedly discussed in the literature.. This article aims to expand the understanding of the consequences of the

1.

There were a total of 1,583 interventions allowed by the Court from cases with neutral

2.

Including cases with neutral citations from 2000 SCC 1-2008 SCC 69, there were 330
appeals in which interveners were heard, out of a total of 674 appeals.

3.

Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, "The Influence of Amicus Briefs on the Supreme
Court" (2000) 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743 (amicus briefs were filed in approximately 85 per cent
of appeals before the US Supreme Court in the period from 1986-1995); Paul M. Collins
Jr., Friendsof the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and JudicialDecision-Making(New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008).

4.

The Canadian literature on interveners tends not to be empirical and focuses on discussing
issues surrounding the practice of intervention and the role of interveners. See Bernard M.

citations from 2000 SCC 1-2008 SCC 69.
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practice of intervention at Canada's highest court through a systematic empirical
analysis of the effects of interveners.
While the effects of interventions on the Court's decision making have not
been explored through empirical analysis until now, it is relatively clear how
the mechanism of intervention itself operates in practice.' The Court has developed its own rules for determining whether an intervention ought to be allowed.
Generally speaking, according to these rules, interveners before the Supreme
Court of Canada (other than the attorneys general in certain cases) have to seek
leave to intervene and, when leave is granted, interveners are limited to a brief
factum and an appearance at the hearing of the appeal. Under this process, the
Court typically grants more than 90 per cent of the requests to intervene.
Notwithstanding the clarity of this practice on its face, it is considerably
less clear what is motivating the Court to allow intervention and what (if any)
impact interventions ultimately have on the Court's decision making. Consider
first what the Court may be intending to achieve by allowing interveners to make
submissions in an appeal. There are at least three functions that the practice of
intervention might satisfy. The first possibility is that hearing from interveners
might provide objectively useful information to the Court (i.e., interveners might
promote the "accuracy" of the Court's decision making). A second possibility is
that the practice of intervention allows interveners to provide the "best argument"
for certain partisan interests that judges might want to "affiliate" or be associated
with. A third possibility is that interventions are allowed mainly (if not only) so
that intervening parties feel they have had their voices heard by the Court and
Dickens, "A Canadian Development: Non-Party Intervention" (1977) 40 Mod. L. Rev. 666;
Welch, "No Room at the Top: Interest Group Intervenors and Charter Litigation in
the Supreme Court of Canada" (1985) 43 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 204; Kenneth P. Swan,
"Intervention and Amicus Curiae Status in Charter Litigation" in Robert J. Sharpe, ed.,
CharterLitigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 27; Philip L. Bryden, "Public Interest
Intervention in the Courts" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 490; John Koch, "Making Room: New
Directions in Third Party Intervention" (1990) 48 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 151; Eugene Meehan,
"Intervening in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1994) 16 Advocates' Q. 137; Gregory Hein,
"Interest Group Litigation and Canadian Democracy" in Paul Howe & Peter H. Russell,
eds., JudicialPower and CanadianDemocracy (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press,
2001) 214; Ian Brodie, Friendsofthe Court: The PrivilegingofInterest Group Litigants in
Canada(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); and Donald R. Songer, The
Transformation ofthe Supreme Court of Canada(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008)
(particularly chapter 5, "Understanding the Decision-Making Process").

Jillian

5.

For a historical review, see Koch, ibid.at 155-60.

384

(2010)48 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

the greater public, including Parliament, regardless of the effect on the outcome
of the appeal (i.e., the Court might be promoting the "acceptability" of its decisions by allowing for an outlet for the expression of strongly held views for or
against a certain outcome). Of course, it would be naive to think that taken on
its own any one of these three functions could provide a complete explanation
for the heterogeneous practice of intervening at the Supreme Court of Canada.
It is easy to imagine circumstances in which each of the three accounts of intervention finds a degree of fit.
With the foregoing caveat in mind, the purpose of this article is to identify,
to the extent possible, the mix of functions interveners played at the Supreme
Court of Canada from 2000 to mid-2009. In part, this analysis involves examining the extent to which interveners during this period have had an impact on the
decision making of the Court and, in particular, of individual judges. In pursuit
of this end, Part I of the article examines and elaborates upon the three theoretical core justifications-accuracy, affiliation, and acceptability-that the Court
may have in mind when allowing interventions. Part 1I summarizes the descriptive data that were developed for this article. The data encompass all cases decided
by the Supreme Court of Canada from January 2000 to July 2009. Part II also
sets out the method for the coding of the cases and provides some descriptive
statistics on the extent and types of interventions before the Court in this period.
Part III then uses these data to examine the impact of interventions before the
Court. It discusses whether the fact that there is an intervener (or a particular
type of intervener) affects whether the appeal is allowed or not, or is decided
conservatively or liberally. It also examines whether there is a connection between
particular judges and particular types of interveners. Part IV concludes.

.I. WHY MIGHT INTERVENERS MATTER?
The practice of intervention represents a departure from the general idea in our
adversarial legal tradition that a case should be resolved through the presentation
of competing arguments to the adjudicator by the parties directly involved in a
discrete legal dispute. In recognition of the fact that intervention is a departure
from the norm, interveners must, in general, obtain some form of permission to
intervene in a case-whether they seek to intervene before a lower court or the
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country's highest court.' The Supreme Court of Canada has established its own
rules governing interventions. The rules have historically been imprecise, allowing any party interested in an appeal to seek leave to intervene, with the Court
imposing terms and conditions as it deems appropriate in the circumstances.'
The Court briefly expanded the rules permitting interveners in the mid-1980s,
but by the end of the 1980s a new practice was established.' It is now the case
that any party interested in an appeal before the Supreme Court is permitted to
bring a motion for leave to intervene.! The motion is generally heard by a single
judge of the Court or, in circumstances when a motions judge is not available,
by the registrar of the Court.
As mentioned above, there are three broad types of explanations for why a
court may wish to allow interventions: accuracy, affiliation, and acceptance.
Before going on to explain in more detail what lies behind each of these motivations, consider the following example, which will provide the intuition behind
the three motivations we identify. Suppose that a judge with environmentalist
leanings is faced with deciding whether to allow interventions by two parties:
(1) an environmental group and (2) an organization representing a consortium
of mining companies. The accuracy rationale would suggest allowing both interventions if there is a prospect that new information or arguments would be
presented by the parties. The affiliation rationale would suggest to the judge that
he or she might want to allow the environmental grotip to intervene because he
or she is more likely to sympathize with and identify with the environmental
group, whereas this is less likely to be the case with the organization representing
the consortium of mining companies. The acceptance rationale is the broadest
of the three rationales. It would suggest hearing from both interveners, even if
they are not likely to add any information or arguments to the appeal, on the
6.

As discussed below in Part II, there are exceptions to the need to seek leave to intervene. The
most important for our purposes is that the attorneys general have a right to intervene in
cases where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged.

7.

The rule used to state that "any person interested in an appeal may, by leave of the Court or
a Judge, intervene therein upon such terms and conditions and with such rights and
privileges as the Court or Judge may determine." See Rule 60 of the Rules ofthe Supreme
Courtof Canada (1977), quoted by Welch, supra note 4 at 215.

8.

See Brodie, supra note 4 at 17-18; Swan, supra note 4 at 32-35.

9.

Rules 55 to 59 of the current Rules ofthe Supreme Court of Canadaaddress interventions and
govern motions for leave to intervene. See Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada,
S.O.R.12002-156, as am. by S.O.R./2006-203.
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basis that giving the interveners the chance to air their views will mean that the
Court's ultimate decision will be accorded more respect than it would receive
otherwise. It should be obvious from this example that a judge's decision to
allow interventions can be over-determined; that is, a judge may well find that
the accuracy rationale is sufficient to allow both interventions but, at the same
time, remain moved by the affiliation and acceptance rationales in the case of
the environmental group, and by the acceptance rationale in the case of the
organization representing the consortium of mining companies.
Of the three rationales for permitting interventions, accuracy is probably
the most widely accepted basis for granting intervener status to a party."o The
accuracy rationale for permitting interventions is that the court will allow a party
to intervene if it believes that the party has some information or arguments
that would enable the court to make a better or more accurate decision. The
idea is that, by hearing from the intervener, the Court will learn information or
be exposed to arguments that it would not otherwise be exposed to, and this
will increase the probability that an optimal disposition of the appeal will be
reached." The new information or arguments presented by interveners may,
inter alia, address the impacts of the decision on parties not before the court
(with respect to the externalized costs and benefits of the Court's decision not
borne directly by the parties to the appeal). For example, where a dispute concerns
the permissibility of a certain land development proposal between a township and

10.

See e.g. Dickens, supra note 4 at 674; Bryden, supra note 4 at 507-08; and Koch, supra note
4 at 152. For a comparative perspective, see George Williams, "The Amicus Curiae and
Intervener in the High Court of Australia: A Comparative Analysis" (2000) 28 Fed. L. Rev.
365 at 366. Williams states that "[iln courts that deal with complex matters that can have
far-reaching implications beyond the settlement of the particular dispute, assistance can be
gained from more wide-ranging argument, such as on underlying policy choices, or on how
the court's decision might affect society more generally."

11.

Accuracy in this context does not necessarily imply that there is a single correct answer to
each appeal. The information from the intervener may simply improve the ability of the
Court to understand the issues surrounding the appeal. See Lewis A. Kornhauser,
"Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial
System" (1994-1995) 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1605 (examining optimal judicial structure and
refusing to define the meaning of a "correct" judgment, arguing that "correct" could refer to
the welfare maximizing decision or some other notion of correctness); Lewis A. Kornhauser,
"Modeling Collegial Courts 1: Path-Dependence" (1992) 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 169
(arguing that, on appeal, most legal decisions are dichotomous-i.e., have a "yes" or "no"
answer).
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a developer, an intervener might bring arguments surrounding the negative effects of the development on a downstream community. Interveners may also
provide information about the impact of the decision in other cases or in circumstances beyond the appeal directly before the Court, in the hope that the
Court will avoid (or make) obiter statements that may be damaging (or beneficial) to other interests.
A desire to improve the accuracy of the decision through the provision of
information by the intervener seems to underlie and motivate the Court's current
rules regarding interventions. Although the rules do not explicitly set out the
grounds on which a motion for leave to intervene is to be allowed, the materials
furnished to the Court in support of a motion for intervener status are required
to include certain information. It is reasonable to assume from this required
information that it encompasses information that will be relevant to adjudicate
the merits of the motion for leave to intervene. The required information includes:
*

*
*
*

the party's interest in the proceeding, including any prejudice that
the person interested in the proceeding would suffer if the intervention were denied;
the position the party intends to take;
the submissions the party will advance and their relevance to the
proceeding; and
the party's reasons for believing that the submissions will be useful
to the Court and be different from those of other parties.12

The materials supporting the motion, therefore, centre on how the party seeking
to intervene may assist the Court by providing information that is relevant and
non-duplicative of that provided by the other parties.
As Joseph D. Kearney and Thomas W. Merrill note, in order to understand
the reasons behind interventions, a model of what judges are actually doing in
deciding appeals is essential. They argue that the idea that interveners provide
desirable information is connected with the "legal" model of judicial decision
making." The legal model assumes that judges vote in accordance with legal

12.
13.

Rules 55 to 59 of the current Rules ofthe Supreme Court of Canada address interventions and
govern motions for leave to intervene. See supra note 9.
Supra note 3. They also specify three explanations for courts permitting interventions. Their
explanations are similar, but slightly different, from the three discussed in this article. They
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principles and accepted norms of statutory interpretation and precedent." In
the case of ambiguity, judges attempt to interpret the case law or statute in the
manner most consistent with the aims of the statute or case law as a whole. This
view of judicial decision making also assumes that the judges are in some sense
attempting to reach the "best" or "most defensible" decision in each particular
case, regardless of their own particular preferences. Paul M. Collins refers to this
role of interveners as "legal persuasion"-the ability of the intervener to persuade
a judge that a particular decision is correct." The legal model suggests that interveners can improve the accuracy of the decision and, therefore, judges will, all
else the same, wish to have interveners provide information where it is germane,
probative, and non-duplicative.
A second reason for courts to allow interventions is to promote affiliation
or a sense of identification of purpose between the court (or, more commonly,
particular judges) and intervening interest groups with similar policy preferences.
It would not be surprising if judges enjoyed hearing from groups whose arguments matched their own policy preferences and, correspondingly, that judges
would find it harder to refuse leave to intervene to such groups. The affiliation
explanation posits that a version of the well-known psychological phenomenon
of confirmation bias applies to judges considering whether or not to hear from
would-be interveners. 16

argue that courts may allow interventions (1) to provide valuable assistance to the court, an
explanation they connect with the legal model; (2) for no apparent purpose other than,
perhaps, a connection to how other bodies will react to the decision, which they connect
with the attitudinal model of judicial decision making (and perhaps to the strategic model of
judging); and (3) to identify how interested groups want the case decided, which they
connect to a "interest group" model of decision making that posits that judges decide in
accordance with the interests of the most influential groups in society (at 745-48). We argue
that the latter two explanations can be grouped together, while a third explanation is
required, relating to the impact of allowing interveners on the acceptance of the court's
decisions (either in this particular decision or more generally).
14.

For a discussion of the different models of judging, see Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth,
The Supreme Courtand the Attitudinal Model Revisited (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2002) [Segal & Spaeth, Revisited].

15.

Supra note 3 at 89-92.

16.

There is clear evidence that judges are biased in other ways, so it would not be surprising if a
confirmation bias was present as well. See e.g. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, "Bias in
Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges?" (2008) 37 J. Legal Stud. 87.
Choi and Mitu Gulati report that "[jiudges are less likely to cite judges of the opposite
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The affiliation explanation is consistent with the attitudinal and strategic
models of judging. Judges wish to have information about the policy implications
of a decision so they can vote directly in accordance with their preferences (the
attitudinal model) or strategically such that their policy preferences are met when
the actions of the other judges (or other policy-makers such as the legislature)
are taken into account. It is also consistent with a less influential model of judging-that judges make decisions because of how they will be perceived by others
(the court's "audience")." Judges would allow interveners to ensure they got
accurate information about how the groups they care about would view them
(the judges) if they voted in a particular fashion, rather than to get information
about the policy implications per se. Based on this view, another important reason to allow interventions is to permit interveners to communicate the strongest possible legal arguments for judges to justify their preferred outcome from a
policy preference perspective. Finally, and perhaps more benignly, Collins suggests that ideology may mediate how judges view or interpret the information
in interventions, such as by making judges more accepting of information that
is congruent with their policy preferences."
A final reason for courts to permit parties to intervene is to promote the
acceptance of that court's decisions through increased legitimacy." As a consequence of intervening, it is possible that parties may feel that their voices have
been heard by the court and be more willing to accept its ultimate decision as
legitimate irrespective of whether it is consistent with the view that they have
presented for the court's consideration. Judges may, therefore, allow parties to
intervene to have them "buy into" a particular decision. They may also allow
interventions in order to increase the sense of the legitimacy of the process as a
whole and increase acceptance of the decisions of the Court in general or in a
particular area. For example, a strong form of this explanation is advanced by
Ian Brodie in his discussion of why the Supreme Court appeared to allow more
interest groups to intervene starting in the late 1980s:

political party than they are to cite judges of their own party. Moreover, the tendency not to
cite opposite-party judges is greater in high-stakes circumstances" (at 91).
17. See Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on judicialBehavior
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 21-22.
18.

Supra note 3 at 93-94.

19.

See e.g. Bryden, supra note 4 at 509; Koch, supra note 4 at 152.
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During the early and mid-1980s the Supreme Court used its power of judicial
review more actively than it ever had before. It staked out bold new ground using
the Charter, placing no significant limits on its own powers to review government
actions and replace the judgment of government officials with its own. No court
can do such a thing for long without support of political interests. Just as the
Trudeau government found civil liberties and rights oriented groups [to be] useful
allies for legitimating its patriation project, so the Supreme Court found these groups
to be useful allies in legitimating its extraordinary activism. By accommodating
interest groups, the Court blunted their potentially damaging criticism. Allying
itself with "disadvantaged groups" furthermore provided a justification for what
2
otherwise might appear to be an unconscionable power grab. "

This "acceptance" explanation is consistent with the legal model of judging
along with the other two primary models of judging (the attitudinal and strategic
models), although perhaps more so with the strategic model of judging. Under
the attitudinal and strategic models of judging, judges vote at least in part to
further their own policy preferences. The attitudinal model of judicial decision
making posits that judges vote in each case directly for the result that is most in
accordance with their policy preferences. It has been subject to empirical testing
in the literature on US courts. The existing literature generally supports the attitudinal model, particularly in civil rights and civil liberties cases.2 1 The strategic
model of judicial decisions assumes that judges do not "sincerely" or directly vote
for their preferred policy outcome in each case but, instead, shrewdly take into
account how their votes in a particular case will affect and be affected by other
actors, such as other judges on the court and other institutions (including the
legislature and judges on other courts).22

20. Supra note 4 at 47-48.
21.

See e.g. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the AttitudinalModel
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Segal & Spaeth, Revisited, supra note 14;
Cass R. Sunstein et al, Are Judges Political?An EmpiricalAnalysis of the FederalJudiciary
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2006); and Andrew D. Martin etaZl, "Competing
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making" (2004) 2 Perspect. on Politics
761. In Canada, see Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, "Policy Preference Change and
Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada" (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 [Alarie &
Green, "Policy"]; C.L. Ostberg & Matthew E. Wetstein, AttitudinalDecision Making in the
Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007).

22.

See e.g. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The ChoicesJusticesMake (Washington: CQ Press, 1998)
(arguing that justices should be viewed as voting strategically); Thomas H. Hammond, Chris
W. Bonneau & Reginald S. Sheehan, Strategic Behaviourand Policy Choice on the US
Supreme Court (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) (presenting a formal model of
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Judges may be acting in accordance with the legal or the attitudinal model
but still wish to allow interveners, even if they add no useful information, if
they believe there is a need to ensure that whatever the "correct" answer is, it
requires that the parties feel it is legitimate. However, the acceptance explanation seems to accord most closely with a strategic view of judicial behaviour.
Judges make decisions (including whether to allow parties to intervene) in order
to further their policy preferences in light of the actions of all other parties that
may be interested in the decision. In this case, they allow parties to intervene
not to obtain information, but to gain some added ability to ensure that their
policy preferences prevail in the short, as well as in the medium-to-long, term.
Each of these three explanations for why judges allow interventions (accuracy, affiliation, and acceptance) is associated with some predictions about how
judges will react to parties seeking intervention and providing information.
For example, in terms of leave to intervene, a judge may be slightly less likely
to grant leave if the accuracy model prevails over the acceptance model, because
not all groups will have relevant information, but all groups will be more accommodating of an adverse decision if they have been heard from. A more
general desire to have more voices heard, on the other hand, may be revealed
in a broad policy of allowing all (or nearly all) interventions. It is more difficult to determine if the affiliation explanation holds in decisions on leave, as
judges may wish to allow interveners on both sides whenever they allow one
in with which they have an affiliation in order to maintain an appearance of
neutrality and balance.
Another possible indicator (on which we will focus in this article) is how
judges vote in particular cases. The connection between why a court may allow
a party to intervene and judicial decision making may be found in the relationship between the position of particular interveners and how a judge votes
in a particular appeal. Suppose we can categorize votes by judges in particular
appeals as "liberal" or "conservative" (setting aside for now the definition of
what constitutes a liberal or conservative vote). Judges can then be generally
categorized as liberal (or conservative) to the extent they vote in a liberal (or
conservative) direction in a high (or low) percentage of appeals. Interveners
strategic decision making by judges); Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs II & Paul J.
Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the Supreme Court: The Collgial Game (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Segal & Spaeth, Revisited, supra note 14.
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may shift judges away from their long-run average liberal or conservative voting
patterns, and, if so, this influence may provide us with information about the
role the interveners are playing. If, for example, in cases involving liberal interveners, a liberal judge tends to have a higher liberal voting percentage than in
other cases, it may be evidence that the affiliation model is in play-for instance,
that the liberal judges are receiving information that accords with their policy
preferences or bolsters their desire to vote in accordance with their preferences.23
This relationship can be seen in the upper right quadrant of Figure 1. The same
is true for a conservative judge who becomes more conservative in cases involving conservative interveners, as seen in the lower left quadrant in Figure 1.24
Finally, to the extent that the acceptance explanation is predominant, there
should be very little or no correlation between the presence of a particular type
of intervener and how judges vote. In Figure 1, this would mean that each
judge's voting percentage is the same despite the presence of either a liberal or
conservative intervener-that is, their voting remains near the notional vertical line representing their mean liberal voting percentage in all cases. In this
case, there would be no statistically significant relationship between interveners
and judges' voting percentages. In the acceptance case, the purpose of intervention is not to gain information, but to garner acceptance for the position
(legal or policy) that the judge would espouse irrespective of the form or extent
of intervention.25

23.

See Collins, supra note 3 at 94.

Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3. They argue that there should be no connection between
votes in the ideological model and intervener groups, as the judges will vote their policy
preference regardless: "To the extent that amicus briefs provide additional information and
factual background, under [the attitudinal] model they offer information of no relevance to
judges" (at 748). However, we argue that there is information on either the policy
implications or the preferences of particular groups that is relevant to the judge in
determining the outcome that satisfies his or her policy preferences. See also Collins, ibid.
at 93.
25. Another connection, which we will not examine, involves the judge who sat on the motion
to intervene. A judge may have a different voting pattern in cases where he or she sits on the
motion and where he or she does not. There may be a pull towards accepting the arguments
of an intervener that has been recognized as having useful information for the court. The
connection may arise because the particular judge is anchored to the arguments already
provided by the intervener in the motion, such that even under the legal model the judge
may not vote in an entirely "rational" fashion. Similarly, the connection may arise under the
attitudinal or strategic models of judging where the judge anchors to the policy position
24.
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FIGURE 1: INTERVENERS, JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY, AND MODELS OF INTERVENTION
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There remain, however, considerable difficulties in sorting all these stories
out. For example, the endogenous nature of some of these decisions makes it
hard to determine which explanation is operative. There is a complex relationship
between who decides to attempt to intervene, the rules on who gets intervener
status, and the use judges make of intervener submissions. For example, to the
extent that the acceptance model prevails and the information that interveners
provide makes no difference to the ultimate decision, there will be an impact on
whether interveners will wish to attempt to intervene (assuming they can properly
anticipate whether their submissions will have any effect on the voting patterns
of the judges).26 Further, in order to assess which story explains how interveners
affect a judge's decision, we need a measure of the counterfactual-how the judge
would have voted if the intervener had not been present. It is unfortunately very
difficult, if not impossible, to establish this counterfactual empirically. We will
discuss these issues more in Parts II and III, below. Part II describes the data and
reports general information on interventions. Part III discusses the statistically
derived connection between judges' votes and interveners.

presented by the particular intervener. It may be hard to determine this effect given that
judges often allow interveners on both sides of an issue.
26. Interveners may still wish to intervene even if they have no effect on the particular decision.
For example, they may hope that they can get publicity for their cause or provide evidence of
how active they are to potential donors.
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II. INTERVENTIONS DURING THE MCLACHLIN ERA
In order to analyze the role of interveners, we created a database that includes
all judgments decided by the Supreme Court of Canada from January 2000
to July 2009." For each appeal, a broad range of information was recorded,
including data about the identities of the parties, 28 the outcome of the appeal,2
the classification of the appeal into an area of law,30 the justices on the panel
hearing the appeal, the vote of each justice and whether he or she authored an
opinion, and the presence and identity of the interveners, if any, on each appeal.
Additional information was gathered for each intervener. The data collected
specific to each intervener included the lawyers and firms representing the intervener, the position of the intervener at the appeal,"' the number of times the
court cited the intervener in its judgment, whether the intervener appeared in the
same case at the Court of Appeal, the identity of the motions judge allowing
27.

The appeals were accessed through LexisNexis and the Supreme Court of Canada's website.
Nearly all of the data collected are directly verifiable from reference to the Supreme Court
Reports. Some of the data collected was partially subjective and subject to the judgment of
the coder, such as the position of the intervener at the appeal and the appeal's classification.

28.

The category "aboriginal group" includes both individuals and groups of aboriginal descent
involved in aboriginal disputes. The category "business" includes private entities (including
both provincially- and federally-incorporated companies), individuals represented by
corporations, and government-owned businesses (such as Crown corporations) that
participate in open competition with other companies. Those government-owned businesses
that provide services, such as education and health care, are not included, nor are those that
are essentially monopolies (e.g., Canada Post). The category "government" includes all
government ministries, departments, agencies, tribunals, and bodies, such as police, school
boards/schools, agents of the Crown, worker's compensation boards, Canada Post, prisons,
child and family services, hospitals, and universities. The category "individual" includes
estates, residents' associations, community groups and societies, and committees of
individuals. The category "self-regulated organization" includes the provincial law societies
and the College of Dentistry. The category "non-governmental organization" includes
churches, such as the Canadian Council of Churches, and not-for-profit organizations, such
as the Boys and Girls Club and Children's Foundation.

29. The outcome of an appeal was classified as "allowed," "dismissed," or "mixed" (i.e., allowed
in part). References were assigned to an independent category.
30. See the description in Part III, below.
31.

The position of the intervener was classified as "supporting the appellant," "supporting the
respondent," "neutral," or "unknown." It was determined by taking into account citations by
the court, information the intervener published in regard to their participation, and logical
inferences when the intervener's purpose would coincide with one of the parties.
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the application for leave to intervene, and the nature of the constraints put on
the intervener's appearance at the appeal.32
The lifecycle of an intervention has three main stages. The first stage is the
threshold point at which the Court decides whether to hear from a particular
intervener or not. At this point, as explained above, a single motions judge hears
the would-be intervener's explanation of why it is seeking to make submissions
in an appeal. At this first stage, a very high proportion-well over 90 per centof parties seeking leave to intervene is successful." At the second stage of the
lifecycle of an intervention, the Court actually hears from and considers the
submissions of an intervener, usually both in writing in the form of a factum
submitted to the Court and through an appearance at the hearing of an appeal.
At the third and final stage of an intervention, the Court issues its reasons in the
appeal. We focus on this stage as this is the point at which we can most effectively examine the consequences of interventions on the decision making of the
Supreme Court of Canada.
As outlined in Table 1, below, there was a total of 674 appeals decided during
the McLachlin era from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2008." Of these 674
appeals, 330 had submissions by interveners. In Table 1, reference is made to only
those interventions that we coded as either conservative or liberal. The "success
rate" column reflects the rate at which the Court decided consistently with the
orientation of each non-neutral intervention. Figure 2 shows that the proportion
of appeals with interveners increased in the mid-1990s from 20 to 30 per cent to
over 60 percent at the high point in 2007. While this is quite a dramatic increase
in intervener activity, the intervention rate in Canada still pales in comparison
to that at the US Supreme Court. By the 1990s, approximately 90 per cent of
appeals to the US Supreme Court had at least one amicus brief filed. 6
32.
33.

34.

35.
36.

Not all of these data are reported here for the purposes of concision and clarity. The data are
on file with the authors.
From 2000 SCC 1-2009 $CC 38, we recorded 1280 instances of parties seeking leave to
intervene. Of these instances, 1170 were successful, representing a success rate of 91.4 per
cent. In addition, on 361 occasions there were interventions by way of notice by attorneys
general in cases involving statutory constitutionality.
A party granted leave to intervene must make a decision about whether they will submit a
factum and appear before the Court. In most cases, interveners do take up the opportunity to
present information to the Court.
The appeals heard in the first half of 2009 are ignored so that only decisions for the full
calendar years available at the time of writing are included.
See Collins, supra note 3.
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TABLE 1: APPEALS AND INTERVENTIONS, 2000-2008
Year

Appeals

No. with
Interveners

Fraction with
Interveners

Non-Neutral
Interventions

Success Rate

2000

69

31

44.9%

131

58.0%

2001

94

33

35.1%

169

66.9%

2002

86

39

45.3%

128

64.8%

2003

75

42

56.0%

159

52.2%

2004

82

43

52.4%

140

54.3%

2005

85

46

54.1%

205

66.3%

2006

59

28

47.5%

118

59.3%

2007

55

34

61.8%

141

58.9%

2008

69

34

49.3%

123

61.8%

Total

674

330

49.0%

1314

60.6%

FIGURE 7: SCC INTERVENTIONS, 1983-2008
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FIGURE 3: APPEALS WITH INTERVENERS, 1984-2008
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TABLE 2: LEAVE TO INTERVENE, 2000-2008
Intervener

Granted Leave

Denied

Success Rate

Attorneys General (by notice)

361

0

100%

Attorneys General (by leave)

253

6

98%

Public Interest Groups

217

32

87%

Trade Associations

190

10

95%

Financial Interests

131

15

90%

Aboriginal Groups

125

9

93%

Government Interests

113

4

97%

Religious Groups

46

7

87%

Individuals

45

14

76%

Environmental Groups

44

1

98%

Unions

39

6

87%

Public Advocacy Law

34

4

89%

School Boards

25

0

100%

Other

18

2

90%

Total

1641

110

94%

The rate of interventions has varied considerably by area of law. A little
over 50 per cent of the appeals with interventions in the period from 1983-2008
were either Charteror criminal cases. Charterappeals were the most intervener
intensive (see Figure 3), with a rate of intervention approaching 90 per cent
throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The rate for criminal appeals was lower
than the average for other appeals. The percentages for other areas of law were
fairly consistent with the average overall level of interventions, albeit with
some exceptions (e.g., aboriginal law, which tends to exhibit relatively high
rates of intervention).
The proportion of appeals with interveners rose more quickly than did the
average number of interveners per appeal (see Figure 4). In fact, this rate of
interventions per appeal did not vary much from 1983-2008. The appeals with
interveners had an average of 4.1 interveners. The highest number of interveners
was in Charter cases, which had on average 5.7 interveners per case, with the
average increasing over time (from an average of 5.6 interveners per case in the
1990s to 7.6 per case in the 2000s). Criminal cases had a much lower number
of interveners per appeal, with just 2.6 interveners per appeal.
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TABLE 3: SUCCESS RATES BY INTERVENER, 2000-2008
Intervener

Interventions

Success Rate

Religious Groups

46

94%

Attorneys General (by notice)

360

79%

Environmental Groups

44

70%

Individuals

45

68%

Government Interests

113

66%

Public Interest Groups

215

63%

Trade Associations

190

55%

Other

18

54%

Public Advocacy Law

34

54%

Aboriginal Groups

125

54%

Attorneys General (by leave)

252

53%

Unions

39

47%

Financial Interests

131

40%

School Boards

25

16%

Table 2 shows the success rates of parties seeking leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada. As noted above, the Court granted a little over 90
per cent of the applications for leave to appeal. In terms of who is intervening,
about a third of all interventions were by attorneys general, either by notice or
by leave. Public interest groups and trade interests were the next largest groups
of interveners. When seeking leave to appeal, attorneys general had a very high
rate of success (approximately 98 per cent). Individuals had the lowest success
rate, with only slightly over 75 per cent obtaining leave.
The final column in Table 1, above, reveals another interesting. aspect of the
data. For interveners for which we could identify a particular position, the decision was in line with that position about 61 per cent of the time. This success rate
was relatively constant over the period from 2000-2008. However, the success
rate did vary significantly by intervener type. As can be seen from Table 3, religious groups had the highest success rate, followed by attorneys general that
were intervening by notice (that is, an intervention addressing the constitutionality of legislation, which can be done as of right). School boards and financial
interests had the lowest success rates over the period.
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Most parties that seek permission of the Court to intervene are allowed to
intervene. Interventions have increased over time both in terms of the number
of appeals with interveners and the total number of interveners. If there is an
intervention in an appeal, the number of interveners per appeal for all types of
appeals has not changed significantly over time on average, although the number
of interveners per Charterappeal has increased. About 60 per cent of the time,
the final result of the appeal is in line with the position of any given intervener.
While these figures do seem to imply an increasing and successful role for interveners at the Supreme Court of Canada, they do not provide us with information
about the actual effect, if any, of interventions on the decisions of the Court or
of the judges. Indeed, it may simply happen to be the case that interveners tend
to exhibit a tendency to want to bolster relatively strong cases as compared to
relatively weak cases.
To rule out other possible explanations for the observed patterns of intervener
success in the McLachlin era, we need to adopt more sensitive methodologies.
In Part III, we deploy several sophisticated statistical methodologies to control,
in a variety of ways, for other influences and isolate the apparent influences of
interveners on judicial decision making at the Supreme Court of Canada. The
next Part therefore analyzes the extent to which this increasing level of intervention is actually having an impact on the votes of the justices and the decisions
of the Court.

III. DO INTERVENTIONS AFFECT HOW JUDGES VOTE?
An initial determination of the potential impact of interveners on the Court
could be made by examining whether the Court or particular judges vote differently in the presence of interveners. This approach is somewhat naive as it
assumes that any difference in voting between cases with and without interveners
is attributable entirely to the presence of the interveners rather than to the differences in the types of cases in which an intervener may seek to be present. A
controlled experiment would be the ideal way to study the difference interveners
make, since it would allow for sound inferences regarding how judges would
have voted in a similar case with and without interventions. However, such an
experiment is unlikely as it would require random assignment of interveners to
appeals, which would presumably be objectionable to the Court, the parties,
and the interveners.
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One method of ascertaining how judges decide cases is an indirect method
of analysis. This indirect method uses an item response theory model with a
Monte Carlo Markov chain Bayesian estimation method." This approach has
been popularized in the study of the US Supreme Court by political scientists
Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn, and it is one that we have adopted in earlier
studies of the decision making of the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada."
The indirect approach assumes that justices are at least partly influenced by policy
preferences in deciding cases and that these preferences are one-dimensional
(that is, could in theory be arrayed along a line)." Its principal advantage over
other more direct ways of measuring or assessing judicial decision making is
that the estimation results are driven by the votes of the judges. More specifically,
there is no need to claim that any given judgment is conservative or liberal, and
all the votes of all the judges can be used.
As a first step then, we deploy this indirect method on data of judge votes
on all the appeals in an extended dataset, starting with cases heard at the outset
of the 1982-1983 term of the Supreme Court of Canada and ending with the
cases with judgments released up to July 2009. We then split the data into two
sets. The first set includes only appeals that included submissions from at least
one intervener and had at least one dissenting opinion (n = 291). The second
set includes only appeals that did not include any submissions from interveners
and had at least one dissenting opinion (n = 363). These two sets of cases were
then analyzed separately using the indirect method. Figure 5 depicts the results
of this indirect method for justices with votes recorded in at least 100 of the
appeals that had at least one dissenting opinion from 1982-2009.o A quick
glance at Figure 5 clearly suggests that there is a remarkably high correlation
37.

See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the US Supreme Court, 1953-1999" (2002) 10 Pol. Analysis 134.

38.

See Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, "The Reasonable Justice: An Empirical Analysis of
Frank lacobucci's Career on the Supreme Court of Canada" (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 195; Alarie
& Green, "Policy," supra note 21; and Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, "Charter
Decisions in the McLachlin Era: Consensus and Ideology at the Supreme Court of Canada"
(2009) 47 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 475.

39.

For a more detailed treatment of the problems with the assumptions made in the use of this
method, see Alarie & Green, "Policy," ibid.

40.

The estimation procedure included all of the justices who sat on these appeals. Several of the
omitted judges were on so few appeals that their estimates are not worth reporting. The full
results of the indirect analysis are available upon request from the authors.
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FIGURE 5: IDEAL POINT ESTIMATES, 1982-2009
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between the mean of the ideal point estimates with and without interveners for
these nineteen justices; indeed, the correlation is a robust 0.93.
What does this suggest about the effect of interveners? One interpretation
could be that this result shows that interveners have little or no effect on the voting behaviour of the justices. However, the indirect method results in an ordinal
ranking of justices from one pole of the policy space to another-in one case
with interveners and, in the other, without interveners. A more careful conclusion, therefore, is that whatever effect interveners are having on the justices
appears not to be. affecting judicial voting differentially across judges. In other
words, interveners appear to affect each of the judges consistently and in a way
that does not appear to result in significant changes to the ordering of the judges'
revealed policy preferences.
To move beyond this tentative conclusion from the indirect method, we
shift analytical techniques. We begin by characterizing the cases according to
wlether the decision of the Court or the vote by a particular judge is liberal or

ALARIE & GREEN, INTERVENTIONS AT THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

403

conservative. In order to make this categorization plausible, we examined only
five areas of law: "Charter," "criminal," "labour," "tax," and "aboriginal rights"
appeals. This coding was not mutually exclusive and allowed each appeal to be
classified as two different appeal types; for example, an appeal could be considered as involving both the Charter and criminal law. We then classified each
vote and the resulting judgment as conservative or liberal according to the
system used in our previously published work." In Charter appeals, a vote in
favour of the claimant is-considered to be liberal, and a vote in favour of the government is considered to be conservative. In criminal appeals, a vote in favour of
the defendant is considered to be liberal and a vote in favour of the prosecution is
considered to be conservative. In labour appeals, a vote in favour of a union,
labour organization, or worker is considered to be liberal, and a vote in favour of
an employer or business interest is considered to be conservative. In tax appeals,
a vote in favour of the government is considered to be liberal and a vote in favour
of the taxpayer is considered to be conservative. Finally, in aboriginal rights
appeals, a vote in favour of an aboriginal group or individual is considered to be
liberal, and a vote in favour of the government is considered to be conservative.
The first question we address using the direct method is similar to the question asked using the indirect method: is there is any difference in how the Court
as a whole votes in appeals in which an intervener is present as opposed to appeals
where there is no intervener? The dependent variable used in this analysis is the
Court's decision-that is, whether the Court's decision in the appeal was liberal
or conservative. We assume (naively) that we can simply discern the impact of
interventions on the Court's decision making by examining the difference in how
the Court decides when an intervener is or is not present. In order to examine
the possibility that the Court is voting differently in cases simply because appeals
are in different areas of law, we included control variables for the five areas of law.
The results suggest that, if an intervener is present, the liberality of the Court's
decision does not change in a statistically significant way. 2

41.

For a description of this methodology, see Alarie & Green, "Policy," supra note 21.

42.

We ran a probit regression with the Court vote (liberal or conservative) as the dependent
variable. The control variables were the areas of law (Charter,criminal, tax, and labour, with
aboriginal rights omitted), along with a dummy variable for whether an intervener is present.
The intervener variable suggested a small pro-liberal effect on the outcome, but was not
statistically significant.
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These regressions use the rate of the Court reaching a liberal outcome as
the dependent variable and the presence of an intervener as the independent
variable of interest. Progressing in this way can easily mask changes that may be
important, such as how certain types of interventions (i.e., one that is liberal
versus one that is conservative or "neutral") affect the disposition of the appeal
by the Court." In other words, the regressions treat as equivalent the presence
of any intervention, regardless of whether the intervener was in favour or against
the demands of a rights claimant. This is obviously problematic.
For this reason; we also categorized the type of intervention in each appeal
and ran regressions to examine the effect of each intervention on the probability
of the Court reaching a liberal outcome, while at the same time controlling for
the type of case. In this case, statistically strong results emerged. We found that
the addition of each liberal intervener increased the probability of the Court
reaching a liberal outcome by 4.3 per cent and the adldition of each conservative
intervener increased the probability of the Court reaching a conservative outcome
by- 5.2 per cent." The effect of the addition of each neutral intervener was not
statistically significant. The estimated rate of liberal outcomes for the Court as a
whole in Chartercases was 46.2 per cent without an intervener and, therefore,
the presence of one liberal intervener would tend to lead the Court to vote in
favour of the rights claimant 50.5 per cent of the time.
The results for the form of intervention and the disposition of the appeal
by the Court considered as a whole are statistically significant, have the correct
sign, and suggest strongly that interveners affect, to a limited but significant
extent, how the Court decides appeals. However, the above regressions continue
to mask an issue that may be of considerable interest-how does the presence
of interveners affect how individual judges vote, rather than simply how the
Court as a whole disposes of an appeal?"
To address this question, we used the votes of individual judges as the dependent variable instead of the judgment of the Court as a whole. We continued to
use controls for the case type and added interaction terms between judges and the
43.

See Collins, supra note 3 at 97-114 (examining the impact of different categories of
interveners on decision making).

44.

With the exception of the number of neutral interveners, each of these estimates was
statistically significant (at a greater than 99 per cent confidence level).

45.

See Collins, supra note 3 at 9-10 (arguing that judge votes are a better variable of analysis
than court votes).
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form of intervention as independent variables in order to determine how judges
respond to the presence of interveners of different types. The results appear in
Table 4, below.41
TABLE 4: INTERVENER INFLUENCE BY JUSTICE
Estimated Liberal Voting, Charter
Appeals with No Interveners
L'Hueux-

33.9%

+1 Liberal
Intervener
+7.0%

+1 Conservative
Intervener
-6.8%*

+1 Neutral
Intervener
-0.4%

Gonthier**

38.5%

3.9%

-5.0%

5.0%

McLachlin

49.9%

+5.0% **

-6.1%

+8.0% *

Iacobucci

54.1%

1.9%

-3.8%

7.8%

Major

52.2%

1.6%

-3.7%

+7.5% *

Bastarache

42.4%

+3.5%

-4.0%

+7.0% *

Binnie

51.6%

+2.6% **

-3.1%*

5.3%

Arbour

56.6%

2.8%

-3.8% *

7.3%

LeBel

49.5%

+2.1%

-3.3%

5.9%

Deschamps

47.8%

2.3%

-3.4% *

Fish ***

63.3%

1.6%

-4.6%

1.7%

Abella

48.4%

+9.6% ***

-7.8%

11.3%

Charroi

53.2%

+4.5%

-9.3%

10.7%

Rothstein**

34.7%

+4.2% *

-6.6% *

+8.2% *

+37.8%

There are a number of striking results from this analysis. The most important finding is that all of the judges appear to be susceptible to at least one kind
of intervener influence at a statistically significant level. Thus, we cannot say that
even one of the judges is impervious, to the effects of interveners at the Supreme

46.

In Table 4, one asterisk indicates statistical significance at a 90 per cent confidence level, two
asterisks indicate statistical significance at a 95 per cent level, and three asterisks indicate
statistical significance at a 99 per cent level. Statistical significance in the first column,
indicates that a judge votes more or less liberally than Chief Justice McLachlin, since she is

used as the baseline. Statistical significance in the other columns of Table 4 indicates that a
judge departs from his or her voting in "no intervener" appeals in a statistically significant
manner.
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Court of Canada over this period. It appears that conservative interveners significantly affect all the judges. All of the signs are negative for all of the judges
across both specifications, and all are statistically significant. The judges have
been responding to the presence of conservative interveners by voting more
conservatively on average than they otherwise would when no conservative intervener is present. Another striking finding is that all of the judges respond to
the presence of an additional liberal intervener by voting on average more liberally, but at a rate that is less (with the exception of Justice L'Heureux-Dub6) than
the amount by which each would vote more conservatively with the addition of
another conservative intervener. That is, the absolute value of the effect of an
additional conservative intervener is greater than the absolute value of the effect
of an additional liberal intervener. Finally, there is a mystery that emerges from
the results-neutral interveners appear to make the judges vote more liberally
(again, with Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 as the sole exception) on average than do
liberal interveners.
The advantage of conducting the empirical analyses at the level of the individual judge is that it allows us to control to the maximum extent possible for
the idiosyncratic responses to interveners that judges might exhibit. One of the
drawbacks is that, in some sense, we might have taken the controls too far. That
is, there may be certain traits or previous experiences judges have-such as having
been legal academics (or not), being female or male, being appointed as a judge
from a common law province or a province with a civil code (i.e., Quebec), or
having been on the Court for varying amounts of time-that might systematically affect the response of judges to interveners in a non-idiosyncratic way. In
order to see whether the judge-by-judge estimation skipped over some interesting cross-judge traits that may predict, in a general way, how judges respond to
interveners, we ran a variety of regressions with judge votes as the dependent
variable and various non-judge specific traits as the independent variables. The
independent variables include factors such as gender, whether the judge was from
Quebec or not, experience prior to joining the Court, and, as a measure of ideology, the party of the appointing prime minister.
We found that two of these non-judge specific traits were statistically significant. The party of the appointing prime minister appeared to increase the
probability of a judge voting in a liberal direction by just under 4 per cent. This
result was statistically significant at a 90 per cent confidence level. We found that
gender was also significant, with female justices (all else the same) voting in a
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liberal direction at a rate about 4 per cent higher than male justices. This result
was statistically significant at a 95 per cent confidence level. Although this is in
some sense a judge-specific trait, it bears mentioning that in the same regression,
each additional unit of the ideal point score for a judge increased the tendency
for a judge to vote conservatively by 7.6 per cent. This result was significantly
different from zero at a 99.9 per cent level of confidence.
For our purposes, it is also important to examine whether the ideology of a
given judge as measured by the party of the appointing prime minister or by their
estimated ideal point score (from the indirect method) impacts the influence of
different interveners. Under the affiliation story, for example, we would see
judges appointed by Liberal prime ministers or those with negative ideal point
scores particularly influenced by liberal interveners. However, when we include
interaction terms between the party of the appointing prime minister and the
number of different types of intervention (liberal, conservative, or neutral), the
interaction terms are not significant. A similarly insignificant outcome results
when we include interaction terms between a judge's ideal point and the number
of different types of intervention (liberal, conservative, or neutral).4 1 This result
indicates that liberal or conservative judges (as measured by whether they were
appointed by Liberal or Conservative prime ministers or by their estimated ideal
point score in cases without interventions) are not impacted differentially by
interveners with similar policy inclinations.
Notably, in each of the regressions that included judicial traits as independent variables, liberal interveners continued to have a statistically significant
liberal influence on liberal voting rates, but this effect was not as strong in absolute value terms as the conservative influence exerted by conservative interveners.
The mystery, too, remained regarding neutral interveners having a liberal influence on voting by members of the Court.
One final thing we checked is how significant the threshold issue of discriminating between those appeals that have at least one intervener and those that
have no interveners is in its influence on our results. To do this, we repeated our
analysis using judge votes as the dependent variable only on those cases with at
least one intervener. The results are consistent in pattern with the earlier results.
A liberal intervener has a liberal effect of 2.9 per cent, a conservative intervener

47.

We used the estimated ideal point scores from the "without interveners" category, reported
in Figure 5.
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has a conservative effect of 5 per cent, and a neutral intervener has a liberal
effect of 6.4 per cent. All of these coefficients are statistically significant.

IV. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPACT OF
INTERVENTIONS
There appear to be several regularities that emerge from these analyses of the
intervener data. From the indirect analysis, the lesson that emerges is that interveners have little or no effect on how judges sort themselves in policy space.
That is, if interveners are shifting judges in a more conservative or more liberal
direction, it appears that interveners are shifting the members of the Court as a
bloc or, alternatively, not so far or so differentially as to cause judges to occupy
a different ranking in policy space vis- -vis his or her colleagues on the Court.
From the direct analysis, we learn that the presence of an intervener does
have a modest effect in increasing the liberality of the decisions of the Court,
even when one does not control for the type of intervener. Once controls are used
for the identity of the intervener and the form of each intervention (liberal, conservative, or neutral), this effect is disaggregated into a moderate liberal boost of
about 3 to 4 per cent for each liberal intervener, a more significant conservative
boost of 4 to 6 per cent for each conservative intervener, and an equally significant liberal boost of about 4 to 6 per cent for each neutral intervener. Further,
while it appears that some judges are more affected by certain types of interveners
than other judges, the result from the indirect method that the members of the
Court appear to be affected en masse is consistent with these results from the
direct analysis.
We also learned that all judges are susceptible to intervener influence in a statistically significant way. Two measures of ideology appear to affect the liberality
or conservatism of judicial voting. The first is the party of the appointing prime
minister and the second is the judge's estimated ideal point. Gender also matters.
But a judge's province of origin, the length of time a judge has been at the Court,
or the nature of the judge's legal career prior to joining the Court (i.e., academic,
practitioner, appellate judge, et cetera) are all statistically insignificant.
What do these results tell us about our three stories of why the Court may
allow interventions? First, the acceptance story would have required there to
be no statistically significant relationship between the presence of interveners
(or particular types of interveners) and the decision making of the Court or
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particular judges. The modest but significant impact of interveners on voting
by the Court as a whole and by individual judges cuts against the acceptance
story. There may be instances where particular parties are granted leave to appeal
on acceptance grounds, but the evidence suggests that acceptance is not the sole
determinant of a decision to grant leave to intervene.
Second, in terms of the accuracy story, the results from the individual judges
indicate that in the presence of interveners judges in some cases vote in a direction different than would be predicted from general indicators of their ideology.
The clearest example is that judges with high liberal voting percentages (such as
Justices Arbour and Fish) tended to vote more conservatively in the presence of
conservative interveners. Moreover, if the party of the appointing prime minister
is taken as an indicator of ideology, liberal judges (judges appointed by Liberal
prime ministers) vote more conservatively in the presence of conservative interveners and some conservative judges (such as Justice L'Heureux-Dubd, who was
appointed by a Conservative prime minister) vote in a more liberal direction in
the presence of a liberal intervener. The same results hold when the ideal point
of the judge is used instead of the relatively crude "party of the appointing prime
minister" measure of ideology.
Finally, we found little support for the affiliation story, particularly given
the difficulties of separating it from the accuracy story. For example, there is clear
evidence that conservative judges (judges with low liberal voting rates) vote conservatively in the presence of conservative interveners, but so too do liberal judges.
It may be that they are all getting useful information from these interveners. As
noted above, when the cross-judge characteristics were included rather than the
judges themselves, the party of the appointing prime minister had a small, but
statistically significant, impact on how judges voted. However, the key is how
ideology impacts the way in which particular judge votes in the presence of a
similarly inclined intervener. Our results indicate that liberal or conservative
judges (as measured by the party of the appointing prime minister or by the
judge's ideal point score) are not particularly affected by interveners with similar
policy inclinations.
The number of interveners before the Supreme Court of Canada has increased rapidly in recent years. On one view this increase could be concerning-it
could indicate that judges of the Court are merely trying to justify or bolster
their pre-existing policy inclinations by allowing submissions from interveners
with similar views. Alternatively, the Court may be granting interventions to try
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to gain acceptance of its decisions by a larger community, but without any observable benefit in terms of the accuracy of the Court's decisions. However, our
results are consistent with a more optimistic story. The Court is allowing a higher
number of intervening parties and appears to be using the interventions to better
understand the impacts of its decisions. This optimistic story is similar to what
Collins found in examining the impact of interveners in the United States."' In
contrast, however, far fewer appeals have interveners at the Supreme Court of
Canada. This result may also be consistent with the optimistic story. The Court
here is particularly willing to hear from interveners if there is a possibility of
gaining some valuable information-and potential interveners understand this.
For that reason, there may be a feedback effect on the willingness of would-be
interveners to attempt to obtain leave to intervene. The increase in the number of
interveners, so far at any rate, seems to be a positive development in the practice
of the Court.

48. See Collins, supra note 3.

